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INTRODUCTION
Both state law and products liability tort suits regulate
prescription drugs. 1 Generally, a prescription drug manufacturer has a
duty to warn physicians of any dangerous effects that the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know are inherent in the use of the prescription
drug. 2 A prescription drug manufacturer that fails to warn a physician
can be held liable for breach of duty. 3 State-law products liability
claims based on this failure are commonly referred to as “failure-towarn claims.”
In addition to state regulation, prescription drugs are strictly
regulated by federal law. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
was created to supplement protection already provided by state

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., Molecular and Cellular Biology, 2005, University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign.
1
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009).
2
Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability of Prescription Drug
Manufacturer for Drug User’s Suicide or Attempted Suicide, 45 A.L.R. 6th 385
(2009) (citing 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 249).
3
Id.
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regulation and common-law products liability. 4 The FDCA requires
that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 5 approve prescription
drug labels before the prescription drugs may be distributed for sale.6
Additionally, the FDCA specifies what information must be included
on the label, where it must be placed, and how to change information
on the label. 7 Upon a determination that a proposed warning label is
false or misleading, the FDA will deny approval and distribution of
that prescription drug. 8 Therefore, if the FDA finds that there is
insufficient evidence that a prescription drug could have the side effect
listed on the warning label, it will withdraw the drug from
distribution. 9 Additionally, a Changes Being Effected (CBE)
supplement permits a manufacturer to change its warning label “to
reflect newly acquired information” without prior FDA approval. 10
When state and federal regulation of prescription drugs
conflict, a determination must be made as to whether federal law
preempts state law. This principle of federal preemption derives from
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 11 A
preemption analysis is based on the assumption that the historic police
powers of the states are not to be superseded by federal law unless
Congress clearly intended it to do so. 12 This presumption is
4

Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195.
“The FDA is charged with ‘promot[ing] the public health by promptly and
efficiently reviewing [drug manufacturers’] clinical research and taking appropriate
action on the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner’ and ‘protect[ing]
the public health by ensuring that . . . drugs are safe and effective.’” Colacicco v.
Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397
(2006)).
6
See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397.
7
Id. §§ 331, 332, 355.
8
Id. § 352.
9
Id. § 355(e).
10
See 21 C.F.R. 601.12.
11
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
12
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009).
5
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particularly applicable where matters related to health and safety are
involved. 13 Determining whether a presumption of preemption applies
is the first step that a court takes in determining whether state law or
federal law prevails. 14
Where the court finds no express presumption of preemption,
the court applies a conflict preemption analysis to determine the
propriety of preemption. 15 Under the doctrine of conflict preemption,
preemption of state law may be inferred where it is impossible to
comply with both federal and state law or where state law “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.” 16
Historically, there has been a presumption against preemption
with regard to prescription drugs. 17 Courts have often concluded that,
because state-law failure-to-warn claims fall within the states’ police
powers over the health and safety of its citizens, the presumption
against preemption of state law should apply. 18 This view was
reaffirmed with the 1962 FDCA amendment, in which Congress took
care to preserve state law by adding a savings clause 19 that indicated
that federal law would preempt state law only upon a “direct and
positive conflict” with the FDCA. 20 Accordingly, state-law failure-to-

13

See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
716 (1985) (in order for federal law to preempt state law, there must be a conflict
that is strong enough to overcome the presumption that state and local regulation of
health and safety matters can coexist with federal regulation).
14
See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95.
15
See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2008).
16
Washington v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 (S.D.
Miss. 2006).
17
See e.g., Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715–16.
18
See id.
19
“The intention of Congress in inserting a savings clause is not to preserve
common law claims when they conflict with federal regulatory standards, but to
prevent a manufacturer from having a complete defense to a common law action not
addressed by a standard by merely stating that it is in full compliance with all federal
safety standards.” 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923 (2010).
20
See 1962 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781,
76 Stat. 780.

310
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 10

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

warn claims continued to evade preemption despite FDA
regulations. 21
In 2001, the landscape of federal preemption began to change.
Many prescription drug manufacturers began filing preemption
motions in the district courts, and in many of these cases, the FDA
filed amicus briefs in support of these manufacturers. 22 This was the
first step in the movement toward federal preemption. The preamble to
Congress’s 2006 FDCA amendment strengthened this movement by
expressly stating that preemption applies to “claims that a
[manufacturer] breached an obligation to warn by failing to include a
statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which had
been proposed to FDA for inclusion in labeling, if that statement was
not required by FDA at the time plaintiff claims the [manufacturer]
had an obligation to warn.” 23 This amendment also provided for
“changes being effected” supplements, which allowed manufacturers
to change labels prior to FDA approval based on newly acquired
information. 24
The Third Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to
address the issue of preemption in the context of prescription drugs. 25
In Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., the court considered whether action taken
by the FDA and its corresponding regulatory scheme preempted the
plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims. 26 Based upon its
consideration of the presumption against preemption, Congressional
intent, and the FDA’s actions taken pursuant to its statutorily-granted
authority, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-towarn claims conflicted with federal law, and thus were preempted. 27
21

See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 340 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“By the time Congress enacted the MDA in 1976, state common-law
tort claims for drug labeling and design defects had continued unabated despite
nearly four decades of FDA regulation.”).
22
Id.
23
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason I), 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625
(C.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 269).
24
Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 259.
25
Mason I, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
26
521 F.3d at 256.
27
Id. at 276.
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Because the Seventh Circuit had yet to address the issue of preemption
in the context of prescription drugs, the district court in Mason v.
SmithKline Beecham Corporation relied upon the Third Circuit’s
reasoning in Colacicco. 28 The court held that, because the FDA had
repeatedly rejected the warning label that the plaintiffs contended state
law required, the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims were
preempted. 29
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court was given the
opportunity to consider the presumption against preemption in the
context of prescription drugs. 30 In its landmark decision in Wyeth v.
Levine, the Supreme Court “restored the landscape of federal
preemption to its pre-2001 form.” 31 The Court established a new
standard for federal preemption. 32 It held that, absent clear evidence
that the FDA would not have approved a prescription drug label that
the plaintiffs asserted was required by state law, federal law would not
preempt the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims. 33
The Seventh Circuit recently had the opportunity to reconsider
the lower court’s decision in Mason v. SmithKline Beecham
Corporation in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Levine. 34 The
Seventh Circuit adopted the standard set forth in Levine—absent clear
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a drug labeling
change, state-law failure-to-warn claims are not preempted. 35 The
court used the facts in Levine as a baseline to determine whether the
manufacturer effectively demonstrated that the FDA would not have
approved the label change that the plaintiffs asserted was required by
state law. 36 The court found insufficient facts to establish clear
28

See Mason I, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
Id. at 626.
30
See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
31
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason II), 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir.
2010).
32
See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
33
Id.
34
See Mason II, 596 F.3d at 391.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 392 (stating that if the evidence were less compelling than it was in
Levine, the court would not find preemption).
29
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evidence and thus, held that FDA regulations did not preempt the
plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims. 37 In doing so, the Seventh
Circuit overturned the decision of the lower court.
The Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the “clear evidence”
standard reflects an apparent shift toward a presumption against
preemption. Admittedly, states have an interest in the health and safety
of their citizens; however, the shortcomings of the presumption against
preemption outweigh this interest. This Note analyzes the presumption
against preemption in the context of prescription drugs and argues that
Congress should enact an express preemption clause for prescription
drugs similar to the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. 38
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Federal and State Regulation of Prescription Drugs

Prescription drugs are regulated by both state law and products
liability tort suits. 39 Generally, a prescription drug manufacturer has a
duty to warn physicians of any dangerous effects that the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know are inherent in the use of the prescription
drug. 40 If the manufacturer does not effectively warn the physician,
the manufacturer can be held liable for a breach of duty. 41 State
products liability actions based on this failure to provide adequate
warnings are commonly known as “failure-to-warn” claims. 42 To
successfully bring a common law failure-to-warn claim, the consumer
bears the burden of proving that the manufacturer failed to adequately
warn him of any risks associated with the prescription drug and that
37

Id. at 396 (finding that the manufacturer did not meet its burden of
demonstrating by clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected a label change).
38
This statute provides that, after a medical device receives FDA pre-market
approval, a state may not establish or enforce any requirement that (1) is different
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under federal law, and (2) relates
to the safety or effectiveness of the device. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
39
See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195.
40
Rosenhouse, supra note 2.
41
Id.
42
See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1240 (2010).
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the failure to warn was the proximate cause of the consumer’s
injury. 43
Prescription drugs are also strictly regulated by federal law.
The FDCA requires approval of a prescription drug’s warning label
before it may be distributed for sale. 44 The FDCA specifies what risk
information must be included in the label, where the information must
appear, and how to change information on the label. 45 Where the FDA
finds that a warning label is false or misleading, it will deny approval
of the prescription drug. 46 Additionally, the FDA will withdraw
approval of any prescription drug already on the market upon receipt
of information that there is a lack of substantial evidence that a
prescription drug will have the effect that the warning label suggests. 47
When state and federal regulation of prescription drugs
conflict, a determination must be made as to whether federal law
preempts state law. In these situations, some courts have held that
state-law products liability claims based on inadequate warnings were
preempted, or supplanted, by FDA regulation. 48 However, other courts
have concluded that state-law failure-to-warn claims fall within the
states’ police powers to regulate the health and safety of their citizens,
and thus, a presumption against preemption should apply. 49

43

Rosenhouse, supra note 2.
See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195.
45
21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 355 (2006).
46
Id. § 352.
47
Id. § 355(e).
48
See, e.g., O’Neal v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 551 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1009
(E.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the plaintiff’s state law claim based on an inadequate
warning label was preempted by federal law); see also Dusek v. Pfizer Inc., No.
Civ.A. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 2191804 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004).
49
See supra text accompanying note 14.
44
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A. Federal Preemption Generally
The principle of federal preemption, 50 that federal law can
supplant inconsistent state law, derives from the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. 51 There are three different types of
federal preemption. 52 The first type of preemption, known as express
preemption, preempts state law where a federal statute unequivocally
states that its provisions preempt state law. 53 The second and third
types of preemption, field preemption and conflict preemption, fall
into the category of implied preemption. 54 Under implied preemption,
state-law claims are preempted where “Congressional intent is inferred
from the existence of a pervasive regulatory scheme” or where “state
law conflicts with federal law or interferes with the achievement of
federal objectives.” 55 Specifically, under the doctrine of field
preemption, federal preemption may be inferred from Congress’s
intent to control an entire regulatory field. 56 Under the doctrine of
conflict preemption, preemption of state law may be inferred where it
50

Here, federal preemption refers to ordinary preemption rather than to
complete preemption. Ordinary preemption is a federal defense to plaintiff’s statelaw claim and may arise either expressly by statute or by a direct conflict between
state and federal law. Washington v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d
725, 727 (S.D. Miss. 2006). Complete preemption, however, is jurisdictional in
nature and authorizes removal to federal court. Id.
51
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
52
Washington, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
53
Id. (“Under express preemption, the federal statute must clearly state that its
provisions preempt state law.”).
54
Id. (“The second and third categories of ordinary preemption, field
preemption and conflict preemption, must be implied from the circumstances.”).
Express and implied preemption differ in that, in an implied preemption analysis, it
is possible to infer Congressional intent to preempt state law based only on the effect
that allowing state law products liability claims would have on the federal scheme
established by Congress. 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923 (2010).
55
Washington, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
56
63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923.
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is impossible to comply with both federal and state law or where state
law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 57
B. Federal Preemption in the Context of Prescription Drugs
All three categories of federal preemption require a court to
discern Congressional intent. 58 Where Congress has not explicitly
stated that federal law preempts state law, preemption may be implied
where there is an actual conflict between state law and the federal
regulatory scheme. 59 Courts have traditionally applied a presumption
against preemption unless a person or entity that is seeking to have the
law preempted demonstrates that there is clear Congressional intent to
preclude the states from acting. 60
The most commonly implicated category of preemption in the
context of prescription drugs is conflict preemption, which is
implicated when it is impossible for a prescription drug manufacturer
to comply with both state and federal prescription drug regulations. 61
Courts have often concluded that, because state-law failure-to-warn
claims fall within the states’ police powers over the health and safety
of its citizens, the presumption against preemption should apply. 62
Until 1962, the FDA carried the burden of proving that a
prescription drug was unsafe to prevent distribution of that
prescription drug. 63 In 1962, however, Congress amended the FDCA
to require manufacturers to demonstrate that their prescription drugs
were “safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the proposed labeling” before they could be distributed. 64
This amendment effectively shifted the burden of proof from the FDA
57

Washington, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 730.
Id.
59
63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923.
60
See e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000).
61
Washington, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 730.
62
Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
715–16 (1985).
63
Id.
64
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009).
58
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to the manufacturer. 65 Significantly, Congress took care to preserve
state law by adding a savings clause to this amendment, 66 which stated
that federal law would preempt state law only upon a “direct and
positive conflict” with the FDCA. 67 Accordingly, plaintiffs continue to
successfully bring state-law failure-to-warn claims despite FDA
regulations. 68
Until the early 2000s, prescription drug manufacturers rarely
invoked the defense of federal preemption. 69 Notably, when
manufacturers asserted this defense, they rarely succeeded. 70
However, this began to change in 2001, when many prescription drug
manufacturers began filing preemption motions in the district courts,
and in many of these cases, the FDA filed amicus briefs in support of
these manufacturers. 71 This was the first step in the movement away
from a presumption against preemption.
This movement toward preemption was bolstered by
Congress’s 2007 FDCA amendment. The preamble to this amendment
expressly states that preemption applies to “claims that a
[manufacturer] breached an obligation to warn by failing to include a
statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which had
been proposed to FDA for inclusion in labeling, if that statement was
not required by FDA at the time plaintiff claims the [manufacturer]
had an obligation to warn.” 72 The 2007 amendment also granted the
65

See 1962 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781,
76 Stat. 780.
66
“The intention of Congress in inserting a savings clause is not to preserve
common law claims when they conflict with federal regulatory standards, but to
prevent a manufacturer from having a complete defense to a common law action not
addressed by a standard by merely stating that it is in full compliance with all federal
safety standards.” 63B AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1923 (2010).
67
See 1962 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781,
76 Stat. 780.
68
See supra text accompanying note 22.
69
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason II), 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir.
2010).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason I), 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625
(C.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2008)).
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FDA statutory authority to require manufacturers to alter their
prescription drug labels based on safety information discovered after
initial FDA approval. 73 By choosing not to enact any provision that
would have required FDA preapproval for all label changes, Congress
reinforced its position that manufacturers were responsible for
updating their own labels. 74
C.

Cases Holding That Failure-to-Warn Claims are Preempted

The Third Circuit was the first appellate court to extensively
address the issue of preemption in the context of suicide from
prescription drugs, in Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc. 75 There, the court
considered whether action taken by the FDA and its corresponding
regulatory scheme preempted the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn
claims. 76
SmithKline Beecham, doing business as GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK), manufactures the antidepressant Paxil, a selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI). 77 Lois Colacicco, a fifty-five-year-old
woman, was prescribed Paxil on October 6, 2003, to treat
depression. 78 Shortly thereafter, Colacicco began taking the generic
version of Paxil, manufactured by Apotex, Inc. 79 Less than a month
later, Colacicco committed suicide. 80 At the time of her death, the
label for the prescription drug included a warning, identical to that of
Paxil, which stated that the “possibility of suicide attempt is inherent
in major depressive disorder and may persist until significant

73

See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 2011).
Id. (citing S. 1082, 110th Cong. § 208 (2007) (as passed) (proposing new §
506D)).
75
Mason I, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
76
Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 256.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
74
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remission occurs.” 81 The label failed to warn of any increased risk of
suicide. 82
After her death, Colacicco’s husband filed suit against Apotex
and GSK in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. 83 Mr. Colacicco alleged that both Apotex and GSK
violated state common-law tort rules by selling prescription drugs with
labels that failed to warn patients about the increased risk of suicide. 84
Both manufacturers moved for dismissal on the ground that federal
law preempted the state-law failure-to-warn claim. 85 The district court
dismissed Colacicco’s claim on the basis of preemption. 86
On appeal, Colacicco argued that because CBE supplements
allowed manufacturers to strengthen and augment prescription drug
warning labels without prior FDA approval, the FDA labeling
requirements “constitute[d] mere minimum standards of information
that may be required in their labeling.” 87 Thus, it was possible for
GSK to comply with both state and federal labeling regulations. 88 In
response, the manufacturers argued that, even though changes made
under CBE regulation do not require prior FDA approval, the FDA has
the final authority on the legality of those labels, and thus preemption
should apply. 89 Thus, the court was faced with the issue of whether the
plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims conflicted with the federal
scheme. 90
In its analysis, the Third Circuit first considered whether there
was an applicable presumption of preemption. 91 The court noted that
in all preemption cases, the analysis begins with the presumption
81

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. (citing Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 537–39 (E.D. Pa.
2006)).
87
Id. at 268.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 262.
91
Id.
82
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against preemption, particularly in cases that involve a field
traditionally regulated by the states, unless Congress made its intent to
preempt state law clear and manifest. 92 Courts that have applied a
presumption against preemption tend to premise it on the fact that
states have the power to protect the health and safety of their
citizens. 93 In this case, the plaintiffs argued that preemption was
inappropriate because Congress never expressly stated its intent to
preempt state-law tort actions challenging prescription drug labeling. 94
However, the manufacturers contended that a presumption of
preemption applied to this case because the federal government, not
the states, had traditionally regulated prescription drug labeling. 95
The Third Circuit looked to the purpose of Congress to
determine whether there was any express intent for preemption of state
law. 96 In considering the arguments of both sides, the court found a
lack of Congressional directive expressly approving or rejecting
preemption in the context of prescription drugs.97 Because Congress
did not expressly state its intent to approve or reject preemption in the
context of prescription drugs, the court applied a conflict preemption
analysis to determine the propriety of preemption. 98 Conflict
preemption is applicable when compliance with both federal and state
regulations is impossible or when “state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.” 99
The plaintiff argued that conflict preemption did not apply
because it was possible for GSK to comply with both state and federal
law. 100 GSK argued that, because the CBE supplement allowed
prescription drug manufacturers to strengthen warning labels without
92

Id. at 268.
See supra text accompanying note 14.
94
Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 263.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 264.
97
Id. at 265.
98
Id.
99
Id. (citing Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
100
Id. at 268.
93
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prior FDA approval, the FDA labeling requirements constituted mere
minimum standards. 101 However, the court looked to the FDA’s past
treatment of warning labels for Paxil and found that for over twenty
years, the FDA had actively monitored the potential connection
between suicide and SSRIs and, in finding no scientific basis for the
connection, repeatedly rejected the warning label of increased risk of
suicide. 102 The FDA determined that the inclusion of such a warning
without scientific basis would constitute false and misleading
labeling. 103
Additionally, in determining whether the plaintiff’s failure-towarn claim should be preempted, the Third Circuit considered the
FDA’s actions taken pursuant to its statutorily-granted authority. 104
The FDCA authorizes the FDA to prohibit false or misleading
prescription drug labeling. 105 The standard for adding a warning to a
prescription drug label is the existence of “reasonable evidence of a
causal association [of a clinically significant hazard] with a drug.” 106
Thus, any state law obligation to include a warning asserting the
existence of an association between SSRIs and suicidality when the
FDA had determined that the evidence did not support such an
association would constitute false labeling.107
Another factor that the court considered was the FDA’s
position on federal preemption. 108 The court found that the FDA had
remained consistent in its position that it had the duty to establish
prescription drug warning requirements. 109 The court also
acknowledged that the FDA had remained consistent in its position
that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted as a result of the FDA’s
101

Id.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Labeling Requirements for Prescription Drugs and/or Insulin, 21 C.F.R. §
201.56(a)(2) (2006).
106
See Labeling Requirements for Prescription Drugs and/or Insulin, 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.57(c) (2006).
107
See id.
108
Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 253.
109
Id. at 276.
102
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repeated rejection of warning labels based on insufficient scientific
evidence. 110
Based on the court’s review of FDA regulations, the FDA’s
actions taken pursuant to its statutorily-granted authority, and the
FDA’s position on federal preemption, the court found that the
plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims were preempted by FDA
regulation. 111
In Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation, the United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois was presented
with a case strikingly similar to Colacicco. In this case the defendant,
SmithKline Beecham (SKB), manufactured Paxil. 112 Two days after
the plaintiffs’ daughter, twenty-three-year-old Tricia Mason, began
taking Paxil, she committed suicide. 113 The plaintiffs filed a state-law
claim against SKB, alleging that SKB failed to warn consumers about
the dangerous side effects of the prescription drug, including an
increased risk of self-harm. 114 SKB moved for summary judgment on
the basis of preemption. 115 The court granted summary judgment and
held that the plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims for failure to warn were
preempted. 116
Like the manufacturer in Colacicco, SKB argued that the
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted based on proposed warnings that
directly conflicted with the FDA-approved labeling for Paxil. 117 The
plaintiffs, however, contended that the court should not find that their
state-law failure-to-warn claims were preempted absent clear evidence
of a conflict between state and federal regulations. 118 The plaintiffs
further argued that conflict preemption did not apply to this case
because it was possible for SKB to comply with both state and federal
110

Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
112
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason I), 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 619
(C.D. Ill. 2008).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 620.
116
Id. at 627.
117
Id. at 620.
118
Id. at 619.
111
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law. 119 This argument was premised on the fact that manufacturers are
permitted to strengthen warning labels, without prior FDA approval,
through CBE supplements. 120 Thus, the plaintiffs contended that SKB
could have strengthened the warning label for Paxil and still have met
the minimum FDCA labeling requirements. 121
To determine whether it was possible for SKB to comply with
both state and federal regulations, the district court applied a conflict
preemption analysis. 122 Because the Seventh Circuit had yet to address
whether state-law claims were preempted in the context of prescription
drugs, the district court looked to the Third Circuit’s decision in
Colacicco for guidance. 123
The plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims were based on
the fact that the prescription drug labeling for Paxil was false or
misleading due to its failure to warn consumers of any risk of selfharm. 124 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and followed the
Third Circuit’s reasoning that, where a plaintiff’s proposed labeling
change conflicts with FDA-approved labeling, state-law failure-towarn claims are preempted. 125 The court noted that any other outcome
would present a direct conflict for SKB. 126 If SKB complied with
federal law, it would be exposed to substantial liability from state tort
law claims for failing to add a warning that the plaintiffs contended
was necessary under state law. 127 If SKB acted to avoid state tort law
claims by adding the warning that the plaintiffs contended was
necessary, it would expose itself to federal liability, including the
possibility that the FDA would withdraw its approval of Paxil for false
or misleading labeling. 128

119

Id. at 623.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 621.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 626.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
120
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Wyeth v. Levine: Failure-to-Warn Claim Only Preempted
upon “Clear Evidence”

Almost a year after the Third Circuit’s decision in Colacicco,
the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
preemption in the context of prescription drugs in Wyeth v. Levine. 129
This landmark decision restored the federal preemption landscape to
its pre-2001 form. 130
Wyeth manufacturers Phenergan, an antihistamine prescribed
to treat nausea. 131 Phenergan is a corrosive prescription drug that can
cause gangrene upon entry into a patient’s artery. 132 Phenergan may be
injected intravenously through either the “IV-push” method 133 or the
“IV-drip” method. 134 On April 7, 2000, Diana Levine went to her
health care clinic, where she was prescribed Phenergan to treat nausea
associated with her migraine. 135 The physician administered the
Phenergan through the IV-push method, as opposed to the IV-drip
method. 136 The Phenergan accidentally entered Levine’s artery,
causing gangrene to develop in her right hand and forearm, both of
which had to be amputated as a result. 137
Levine contended that Phenergan’s labeling failed to
adequately warn physicians about the risk of IV-push administration, a
warning that Levine argued was required by state law. 138 Wyeth filed
a motion for summary judgment; its argument was premised on the
129

129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009).
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason II), 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th
Cir. 2010).
131
Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
132
Id.
133
This method of administration involves injecting Phenergan directly into a
patient’s vein. Id.
134
This method of administration involves adding Phenergan to a saline
solution and allowing the liquid to slowly enter through a catheter inserted into the
patient’s vein. Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1191, 1194.
130
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notion that Levine’s failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal
law. 139
The trial court found no merit in Wyeth’s conflict preemption
argument, stating that there was no evidence that the FDA had
“specifically disallowed” stronger language. 140 The Vermont Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Wyeth’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that Wyeth could have, through the FDA’s CBE
regulation, warned against the IV-push administration without prior
FDA approval and that the FDA’s requirements are minimal standards
that do not create a ceiling for state-law warning label requirements. 141
The issue presented to the United States Supreme Court was
whether FDA prescription drug labeling requirements preempt statelaw failure-to-warn claims premised on the theory that different
labeling judgments were necessary to make prescription drugs
reasonably safe for use. 142 Wyeth argued that it was impossible for it
to comply with both state and federal labeling requirements and that
recognition of the plaintiff’s state-law failure-to-warn claim creates an
“obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress” by transferring prescription drug labeling
decision-making from the experts of the FDA to a lay jury. 143
The Supreme Court first considered the purpose expressed by
Congress. 144 Traditionally, courts begin with a presumption against
preemption, based on the policy that historic police powers are not to
be superseded by federal law unless there is clear intent by Congress
to do so. 145 Wyeth contended that the presumption against preemption
should not apply because the FDA had regulated prescription drug
labeling for more than a century, demonstrating clear Congressional
intent for federal preemption. 146 Additionally, Wyeth argued that the
139

Id. at 1192.
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plaintiff’s state-law failure-to-warn claim was preempted because it
was impossible to comply with state and federal regulations—a classic
conflict-preemption case. 147 It argued that the CBE supplement, which
permits a manufacturer to strengthen a warning label without prior
FDA approval, was not implicated in this case because the 2006
amendment provides only that a manufacturer may change its label to
reflect newly acquired information. 148 Wyeth asserted that it could
only have changed the label in response to new information not yet
considered by the FDA, and thus it was impossible for it to strengthen
its label to comply with state-law requirements without violating
federal law. 149
The Court, however, found that Wyeth could have
strengthened its claim though a CBE supplement because, in its notice
of the final rule, the FDA explained that “newly acquired information”
is not limited to new data but also includes new analyses of previously
submitted data. 150 The plaintiff presented evidence of at least twenty
incidents prior to her injury in which injection of the prescription drug
resulted in gangrene and amputation. 151 She argued that Wyeth could
and should have analyzed the acquired data and, through a CBE
supplement, added a stronger warning label about the IV-push
administration of the prescription drug. 152 Ultimately, the Court held
that absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a
change to Phenergan’s label, it would not conclude that it was
impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state
requirements. 153 While the Court found no preemption in Levine, it
stated that preemption could be found where the manufacturer meets a
strict standard of proving that there was clear evidence that the FDA

147

Id. at 1196.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1197.
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Id.
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would not have approved the proposed change(s) in the prescription
drug’s label. 154
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RETURN TO A PRESUMPTION AGAINST
PREEMPTION

III.

In Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation, the Seventh
Circuit reconsidered the lower court’s decision in light of Levine. 155
The court adopted the standard set forth in Levine—absent clear
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a drug labeling
change, state-law failure-to-warn claims are not preempted. 156 The
court found that the Supreme Court failed to clarify what constitutes
“clear evidence” and that the only thing that was apparent was that the
evidence presented in Levine did not constitute “clear evidence” such
that preemption would apply. 157 Therefore, the court was faced with
the task of interpreting the Levine “clear evidence” standard. 158
The court used Levine as a benchmark to determine whether
GSK had presented “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have
approved the plaintiffs’ proposed labeling change. 159 If the evidence
were found to be less compelling than the evidence in Levine, the
court would reject GSK’s argument that federal law preempted the
state-law failure-to-warn claim. 160
In Levine, the Supreme Court first reviewed the administrative
history of Phenergan. It found that the record in Levine clearly
proffered ample evidence that the “FDA specifically considered and
reconsidered the strength of Phenergan’s IV-push-related warnings in
light of new scientific and medical data.” 161 Additionally, there was
evidence that, instead of banning the administration of Phenergan
154

Id. at 1204.
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (Mason II), 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th
Cir. 2010).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See id.
159
Id. at 392.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 393 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1222 (2009)).
155
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through the IV-push method altogether, Wyeth and FDA authorities
agreed that there was a need for better warning of the problems of
intra-arterial injection. 162 A year later, the FDA committee
recommended a stronger label for Phenergan regarding the IV-push
method but decided not to prohibit the administration of the
prescription drug through the IV-push method. 163 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court found that it was clear from the administrative history
of Phenergan that the FDA had “strongly considered a similar warning
to the one that plaintiff proposed and the Court still did not find
preemption.” 164
Following the Supreme Court’s analysis in Levine, the Seventh
Circuit examined the administrative history of Paxil. 165 In 1989, GSK
filed a prescription drug application with the FDA seeking market
approval of its new prescription drug, Paxil. 166 At the time of its
approval, the FDA did not require any warnings of suicide risk. 167
From the date of its approval through February 2003, GSK’s analysis
of suicides and suicide attempts of patients taking Paxil found no
relationship between suicide and Paxil. 168 Additionally, the FDA had
been thoroughly reviewing the available data about prescription drugs
such as Paxil and determined that there was no increased risk of
suicide resulting from consumption of these prescription drugs. 169
GSK also pointed to the FDA’s failure to require a warning about the
risk of suicide just before the suicide in this case as evidence that the
FDA would not have approved the increased warning that the
plaintiffs contended state law required. 170
However, in a press release in October 2003, the FDA
recommended that physicians stop prescribing Paxil to children
because it was investigating the increased risk of suicide resulting
162
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from consumption of this prescription drug. 171 The court found that, in
light of this evidence, it seemed unlikely that the FDA would have
refused to allow GSK to submit a label change to warn Paxil
consumers about the potential risk of suicide for young adults.172
Considering the administrative history of Paxil as a whole, the court
concluded that the evidence fell short of demonstrating by “clear
evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the label change that
the plaintiffs contended was required by state law. 173 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit overturned the decision of the lower court and held
that the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims were not preempted
by FDA regulations. 174
IV.

THE IMPACT OF A PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION

Prior to Levine, state-law failure-to-warn claims were
preempted where the FDA had rejected warnings that plaintiffs
contended should have been included in the warning label. 175 In other
words, because imposing state tort liability for failure-to-warn would
conflict with FDA-approved labeling, federal law preempted these
state-law failure-to-warn claims. However, after Levine, state-law
failure-to-warn claims have been preempted only where the
manufacturer meets the strict burden of proving that there is clear
evidence that the FDA would not have approved the proposed
change(s) in the label. 176 Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. reflects
the Seventh Circuit’s clear shift toward the presumption against
preemption. Admittedly, states have an interest in the health and safety
of their citizens; however, the harms resulting from the presumption
against preemption outweigh this interest. An adoption of an express
preemption clause similar to the Medical Device Amendments of 1976
171

Id.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 396.
175
See generally Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008); see
also Mason II, 596 F.3d at 387.
176
Mason II, 596 F.3d at 391.
172

329
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/10

22

Hart: Federal Preemption of State-Law Failure-to-Warn Claims: Has the P

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

(MDA) would solve many of the harms of the current standard for
prescription drug preemption.
A. Harms Resulting from the Presumption Against Preemption
First, recognition of state-law failure-to-warn claims subjects
prescription drug manufacturers to a multitude of state laws. Standards
of care for prescription drug labeling vary from state to state. 177
“Absent a determination that the FDA-approved labeling and the
FDA’s refusal to require the warnings suggested by plaintiffs . . .
preempt start tort actions, the manufacturers may be subjected to
considerable liability based on varying standards, with no benchmark
that they should follow.” 178 A national standard for prescription drug
labeling requirements would ease the burden on prescription drug
manufacturers of complying with the fifty-one separate regulatory
schemes of each state and the federal government.
Additionally, state-law failure-to-warn claims substitute a lay
jury’s decision regarding prescription drug labeling for the expert
judgment of the FDA. 179 New prescription drugs must obtain the
FDA’s stamp of approval as “safe” and “effective” before being
marketed to the public. 180 Once a product is on the market, the FDCA
employs the FDA to monitor new information and authorizes it to
withdraw approval in light of new safety concerns. 181 A state tort
regime which allows a lay jury to make important decisions about
prescription drug labeling is incompatible with this scheme.
State-law failure-to-warn claims may also lead to
unsubstantiated warning labels. A highly probable risk of holding a
prescription drug manufacturer strictly liable for failure to warn of any
“knowable” risk is the destruction of the viability of any warnings. If
every report of a possible risk, no matter how speculative, imposed an
affirmative duty to give some warning, a manufacturer would be
177

Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 267.
Id. at 267–68.
179
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009).
180
See id. at 1195.
181
21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2006).
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required to provide notice to all physicians of even the slightest risks,
thereby diluting the force of any specific warning. 182
Lastly, recognition of state law failure-to-warn claims stifles
medical research and testing. Courts have noted for many years that
prescription drug tort liability could deter manufacturers from
developing and marketing prescription drugs. 183 Highly beneficial,
commonly used drugs are often incapable of being made entirely
safe. 184 Additionally, because of lack of time and opportunity for
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety for
many new or experimental drugs. 185 However, medical advancement
justifies the development, marketing, and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
B. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)
Until Congress’s enactment of the MDA, the introduction of
new medical devices was left largely to each state to supervise and
regulate in any particular manner. 186 However, the landscape of
medical device regulation began to change in the 1960s and 1970s,
when many complex medical devices thrived and some began to
fail. 187 The most notable medical device failure was the Dalkon
Shield, an intrauterine device that failed in 1970, leading to many
serious infections and deaths. 188 Unfortunately, thousands of resulting
tort claims also failed. 189 Many believed that this demonstrated the
inability of the common law tort regime to manage risks associated

182

See Carlin v. Super. Ct. of Sutter Cnty., 920 P.2d 1347, 1360–61 (Cal.

1996).
183

Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1358.
185
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
186
Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).
187
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Id.
189
Id.
184
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with dangerous medical devices. 190 As a result, Congress stepped in
and enacted the MDA. 191
The MDA created a scheme of federal oversight for medical
devices while dramatically reducing state regulation and oversight
requirements. 192 This statute provides that, after a medical device
receives FDA pre-market approval, a state may not establish or
enforce any requirement that (1) is different from, or in addition to,
any requirement applicable under federal law, and (2) relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device. 193 Accordingly, while the MDA
preempts many state common-law tort claims, it does not preempt
those that do not impose requirements different from or in addition to
federal requirements. Further, the MDA permits the FDA to exempt
certain state and local requirements from preemption. 194
The MDA maintained the FDA requirement of pre-market
approval prior to distribution of any medical device. 195 Pre-market
approval imposes certain specific requirements applicable to all
medical devices, including a review of the device’s proposed
labeling. 196 Once a device has received FDA pre-market approval, it
must be marketed without any significant differences from the
specifications in the approval application because the FDA has
deemed that these specifications provide a reasonable assurance of
safety and effectiveness. 197 Notably, a new medical device is not
required to undergo pre-market approval if the FDA finds that it is a
substantial equivalent of another device exempt from pre-market
approval. 198
After pre-market approval, medical devices are subject to
reporting requirements, which include the obligation to inform the
FDA of any new clinical investigations or scientific studies concerning
190

Id.
Id. at 316.
192
Id. at 312.
193
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
194
Id. § 360k(b).
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Medtronic, 552 U.S. at 313.
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the device that the applicant knows or reasonably should know of 199
and to report incidents in which the device has contributed to death or
serious injury. 200 The FDA may withdraw pre-market approval of any
medical device based on newly acquired data and must withdraw
approval if it determines that the device is unsafe or ineffective under
its labeling conditions. 201
The MDA imposes three different class levels of continuing
oversight for medical devices depending on the risks presented by the
device. 202 Class I medical devices include elastic bandages and
examination gloves and are subject to the lowest level of oversight,
known as “general controls,” such as labeling requirements. 203 Class II
medical devices include powered wheelchairs and surgical drapes and
are subject to general controls and “special controls,” including
performance standards and post-market surveillance measures. 204
Class III oversight applies to medical devices that are purported to be
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use that is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health or
presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury. 205 Because
of the nature of this class of medical devices, it receives the strictest
federal oversight of the three. 206
C. Proposed Prescription Drug Preemption Clause
Congress should enact an express preemption clause similar to
the MDA for prescription drugs. A similar statute would provide that,
after a prescription drug manufacturer has received FDA pre-market
approval, the states may not promulgate any regulations that differ
from or impose greater restrictions than federal regulations. While this
statute would preempt most state common-law tort claims, it would
199

Id. § 814.84(b)(2).
Id. § 803.50(a).
201
Id. § 360e(e)(1).
202
See Medtronic, 552 U.S. at 316–17.
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Id. at 316.
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Id. at 316.
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See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii).
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Medtronic, 552 U.S. at 317.
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not preempt those that do not impose requirements different from or in
addition to federal requirements. Further, Congress could grant the
FDA the power to exempt certain state and local requirements from
preemption. 207
A prescription drug preemption statute should maintain the
current FDA pre-market approval regulations, which are nearly
identical to those for medical devices. However, unlike the MDA,
which permits a new medical device to forego pre-market approval if
the FDA finds that it is a substantial equivalent of another device
exempt from pre-market approval, 208 all prescription drugs should be
subject to pre-market approval because of the risk of resulting injuries
or illnesses.
This proposed statute should maintain the FDA oversight
currently in place for prescription drugs. Congress need not establish
differing class levels for continuing oversight for prescription drugs as
it has done in the MDA 209 because all prescription drugs present a
“potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury,” as is characteristic of
Class III medical devices. 210 Thus, all prescription drugs should be
subject to the most extensive federal oversight.
D. Effects of the Proposed Prescription Drug Preemption Clause
Congress’s enactment of a preemption clause for prescription
drugs similar to the MDA would address many of the harms of the
current preemption standard. First, an express preemption clause
would create a uniform standard of care for manufacturers to observe.
Manufacturers would no longer be subject to the fifty-one different
standards of care currently in place. A uniform standard would
inevitably lead to less tort liability for manufacturers, as it is much
easier to comply with a single standard of care and would result in
lower operating costs to the manufacturer.

207

See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b).
See id. § 360c(f)(1)(A).
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An express preemption clause would also return the decision of
prescription drug labeling requirements to the expert judgment of the
FDA rather than the lay jury because most state-law failure-to-warn
claims will be preempted. This is important because FDA scientists
thoroughly test the safety and effectiveness of prescription drugs
before approving them for distribution 211 and continue to monitor the
safety and effectiveness of the prescription drugs throughout their
distribution. 212 Lay juries do not have the proper experience with
prescription drug labeling to compete with the expertise of the FDA.
Next, an express preemption clause would reduce
unsubstantiated warning labels. Once the FDA has approved a
prescription drug for distribution, the manufacturer knows exactly
what information must be included in the label. Additionally, upon
receipt of new information, the FDA would inform the manufacturer
of any necessary labeling changes. Accordingly, manufacturers would
no longer have to concern themselves with providing notice to
physicians of every possible risk, no matter how minute.
Lastly, an express preemption clause would help reduce the
negative effect that the current standard of preemption has on medical
research and testing. A national standard of care will undoubtedly
reduce manufacturers’ tort liability, which courts have found deters
manufacturers from developing and marketing prescription drugs. 213
As a result, manufacturers will be able to research, develop, and
market highly beneficial prescription drugs that they may not have
otherwise considered researching and developing under the current
standard.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s adoption of the Supreme Court’s strict
“clear evidence” standard reflects a clear shift to a presumption against
preemption. This new standard has subjected manufacturers to
increased tort liability, which has negatively impacted the prescription
211

See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e).
213
Carlin v. Super. Ct. of Sutter Cnty., 920 P.2d 1347, 1357 (Cal. 1996).
212
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drug market. Accordingly, in order to decrease manufacturers’ tort
liability and resolve many of the resulting harms, Congress should
enact an express preemption clause similar to the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976.
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